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AbstrAct
The Great Recession profoundly impacted labor markets in the United States and Spain, the 
two most important destinations for Latin American immigrants. Unemployment rates dou­
bled within two years and increased at an even greater rate for Latino immigrants. Using na­
tional labor force surveys (Encuesta de Población Activa for Spain and Current Population Survey 
for the U.S.), this article compares employment trends of natives, immigrants in general, and 
Latino immigrants in both countries by sectors. We conclude that despite the differences in the 
Spanish and U.S. economies and the historical distinctions between immigration flows from 
Latin America to both countries, the crisis’s effects on employment have similar features and 
show the greater vulnerability of immigrants in general and Latino immigrants in particular. 
Key words: immigrants, Latinos, employment, economic crisis, Spain, United States.
resumen
La gran recesión impactó profundamente los mercados laborales de Estados Unidos y España, 
los dos destinos más importantes para los inmigrantes latinoamericanos. Las tasas de desempleo 
se duplicaron en dos años y el desempleo se incrementó aún más en los inmigrantes latinos. 
A partir de encuestas sobre la fuerza de trabajo nacional (la Encuesta de Población Activa en Es­
paña y la Current Population Survey de Estados Unidos), este artículo compara las tendencias en 
el empleo de los nativos, los inmigrantes en general y los inmigrantes latinos en ambos países por 
sectores. Concluimos que, a pesar de las diferencias en las economías española y estadunidense 
y las distinciones históricas entre los flujos de inmigración de América Latina hacia ambos países, 
los efectos de la crisis sobre el empleo tienen características similares y muestran la cada vez 
mayor vulnerabilidad de los inmigrantes en general y de los inmigrantes latinos en particular.
Palabras clave: inmigrantes, latinos, empleo, crisis económica, España, Estados Unidos.
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this artiCLe CoMpares the employment of Latino immigrants in the U.s. and Spain 
during the Great Recession. These countries have the highest proportion of immi­
grants from Latin America (Connor and Massey, 2010). The majority of Latino im­
migrants are economic immigrants who arrived primarily as a result of a high labor 
demand in labor-intensive sectors, requiring low-skilled workers and offering low 
wages (Piore, 1979; Martin, 2009a; Cachón, 2009). These sectors, such as construction, 
have been particularly affected by the Great Recession. The composition of the labor 
markets in Spain and the United States is different, but both countries have been 
negatively impacted during the various stages of the Great Recession. The immigra­
tion histories, the profile of their Latino immigrant populations, and the immigrant 
experience during economic downturns in Spain and the United States display rel­
evant distinctions. Immigrants have been present during all U.s. economic crises. Con­
versely, for Spain, this is its first economic crisis coupled with a high presence of 
immigrants. Nonetheless, between 2008 and 2011, Latino immigrants living in both 
countries lost twice as many jobs as the total employed population. This article dis­
cusses some of the circumstances that triggered the disproportionally negative ef­
fects of the Great Recession on Latino immigrants in the U.S. and Spain, despite fea tures 
that differentiate their respective migration streams.
The economic crisis that began in 2007 is the deepest since World War II (Elsby, 
Hobijn and Sahin, 2010). The Great Recession is an economic phenomenon that is 
mutating; in the words of World Bank President Robert Zoellick, “What started as a 
financial crisis became an economic crisis [and] is now becoming an unemployment 
crisis –and to what degree does it becomes a human and social crisis?” (Zoellick, 
2009). This crisis differs in important ways from many other recent economic down­
turns (Castles and Miller, 2010; Tilly, 2011). It is global in scale (Martin, 2009b; Alex­
ander, 2010) because it has affected every country. The Great Recession started in the 
U.s. and affects the developed world, particularly European countries, but it has 
effects on less developed countries that had been growing in the last decade. The 
global character of this crisis is particularly significant for immigration because mi­
grants cannot readily switch from one destination to another. As several commenta­
tors have observed, this is also the first time that high international migration has 
combined with a global downturn. Therefore, comparisons with earlier economic 
crises must be also tempered by the recognition that twenty-first-century interna­
tional migration has certain novel characteristics (Rogers, 2009).
Castles and Miller (2010) point out that one factor that makes the effects of the 
crisis for migration hard to assess has been its constantly changing character, which 
has influenced immigrant laborers in differently. The initial epicenter of the crisis was 
on the real estate crisis as a result of the collapse of the U.s. housing market in 2006­2007; 
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in the course of 2007­2008, this mutated into a general financial crisis, with banks in 
critical situations that have ended in bailouts financed by the state. By late 2008, the 
real economy started to weaken, and the world was confronted with an employment 
crisis. Despite some signs of recovery, many regions have so far experienced a jobless 
recovery. As Castles and Miller argue, “States have saved capitalism­as­we­know­it 
by borrowing against the future, but the resulting debt-crisis could make a sustained 
recovery very difficult to achieve.” This debt crisis is exacerbating the employment 
crisis, particularly in some European countries, including Spain.
Although the U.s. and Spanish economies and societies are different, they have 
some traits in common. During the current crisis, these countries had negative mid­
level impacts in terms of economic growth (gdp), but important declines in employ­
ment. The U.s., Spain, and Ireland are the countries in the Organization for Eco nomic 
Co­operation and Development (oeCd) where unemployment rates have increased 
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Figure 1
GDP AND EMPLOYMENT GROWTH RATES FOR SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 
FROM THE FIRST QUARTER OF 2004 TO THE FIRST QUARTER OF 2011
Source:  For Spain: Banco de España, 2011; INE, 2011b. For the United States: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011; 
and bls, 2011.
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the most (oeCd, 2010b). Figure 1 shows significant differences in the evolution of gdp 
and employment in the U.s. and Spain. Their employment trajectories in recent 
years have been similar, although variations have been greatest in Spain, both in the 
economic expansion phase and in the Great Recession. In the second quarter of 2008, 
however, both economies experienced net job loss. Economic contraction began first 
in the U.s. (first quarter 2008) and so did the recovery. From the first half of 2009, the 
U.s. recorded positive growth rates. In Spain, the economic contraction continued 
until the first half of 2010. Spain’s registered growth is currently lower than that of 
the U.s., and its economic prospectus for the immediate future is one of negative growth 
due to the implementation of European Union recommendations for balanced pub­
lic deficits. The contraction of the labor market in Spain has been much sharper and 
the volume of employment continues to decline.
The Great Recession is having important effects on international migration that 
exceed the scope of this article, such as the effects on the migrant flows in the short, 
medium, and long run, the effects on remittances and in the immigrants’ countries 
of origin, as well as the changes that can be expected in immigration policies and the 
potential radicalization of conservative attitudes toward immigrants. All these top­
ics are of great interest and will continue to play a role on Latin American migration 
to the U.s. and Spain in the years to come. 
ImmIgrAnt VulnerAbIlIty And economIc downturn
The vulnerability of individuals or social groups has its foundation in the “holy trin­
ity” of inequality (Massey, 2007): class, race, and ethnicity and gender. Frequently, 
these inequalities combine, creating an additional interactive and multiplicative 
negative effect. Moreover, the ways in which these inequalities operate change over 
time. Immigrants and natives both face vulnerabilities caused by them, but immi­
grants have an additional constraint: the discrimination suffered as a result of their 
immigrant condition, whereby they crossed a border and entered a state where they 
are not citizens, making them a more fragile social subject. Immigrants, then, are 
socially constructed as vulnerable subjects, with an “objective vulnerability” (Portes, 
1978) as a powerless agent. This is the origin of what we have denominated the “dis­
criminatory institutional framework” (Cachón, 1995): the state establishing borders 
and “managing” (recognizing, guaranteeing, or denying) individual rights and dis­
tinguishing between the insiders and the outsiders.
In short, the “discriminatory institutional framework” displays a series of insti­
tutional constraints that delineate paths, place barriers, and establish preferences for 
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some groups over others. In addition to these institutional constraints, the market 
and the host societies offer different opportunities, varying over time, to different 
groups. Immigrants take into account these constraints and opportunities in devel­
oping their strategies, individually and collectively, so that their different forms of 
“capital” (human, social, etc.) are properly recognized by other agents and taken into 
consideration (Cachón, 2009).
The vulnerability of a person or group, such as immigrants, is determined by the 
absolute or relative deprivation of symbolic, social, emotional, or material resources 
or the impossibility to use them in a specific historical context due to institutional, 
political, economic, social, or cultural constraints. This effective lack of resources is 
what makes some groups of immigrants more vulnerable than others. In general, 
immigrant vulnerability decreases over time as the processes of acculturation and 
integration progress. However, these processes follow a “segmented assimilation” 
(Portes and Zhou, 1993; Haller, Portes and Lynch, 2011) that traps immigrants in the 
lower tiers of society. In summary, the condition of being an immigrant makes them 
“categorically unequal” citizens (Massey, 2007). 
In addition to their immigrant condition, another fundamental feature that de­
fines immigrant vulnerability is its class component, as immigrants are concentrated 
in the lower segments of the working class. The immigrants’ working condition, al­
though not common to all of them, is a key element for understanding immigration 
and immigrant vulnerability. Most immigrants are concentrated in lower occupa­
tional categories in destination countries. In many cases, this is a consequence of simply 
having crossed a border, becoming an immigrant. Immigrants experience downward 
social mobility by working jobs with lower prestige that require lower skills than the 
employment they had in their countries of origin (Chiswick, 1978).
Capitalism, in all its stages, always requires supplies of vulnerable, disadvan­
taged workers (Sassen, 1988). Hicks’s argument is clear: “The commodity economy 
has never been able to do without servants” (Moulier­Boutang, 1998). Consequently, 
growing segments in the labor market are more flexible and docile as well as cheaper. 
Massey (2007 and 2009) points out, for example, that in the United States, Mexicans 
are being socially constructed as a “better underclass.” We could argue something 
similar regarding any other immigrant receiving country: its government looks for 
certain characteristics in particular immigrant groups and builds a discourse and 
implements policies for the construction of a “better underclass.”
Several authors have recognized the segmentation of the immigrant labor mar­
ket from different perspectives (Piore, 1979; Moulier-Boutang, 1998; Castles and 
Miller, 2009; Massey, 2007; Cachón, 2009; Portes, 2012). This has produced, in the long 
run, the marginalization of specific immigrant groups. Although in general there are 
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no rigid barriers based on race, ethnicity, or nationality, certain groups are overrep­
resented in disadvantaged positions. In the case of immigrants, their marginaliza­
tion is not entirely explained by specific factors such as education, length of stay at 
destination, or labor market experience. 
The impact of the Great Recession on immigrants is likely to vary across coun­
tries according to economic and political conditions (Papademetriou, Sumption, and 
Terrazas, 2010). But it is a well­documented fact that foreign workers appear to be 
relatively more vulnerable than natives to cyclical downturns (oeCd, 2009; Orrenius 
and Zavodny, 2009; Papademetriou and Terrazas, 2009; Reyneri, 2009; Rogers, 2009; 
Papademetriou, Sumption, and Terrazas, 2010; Tilly, 2011). Certain key elements 
could explain this increased immigrant employment vulnerability during economic 
downturns. A key structural factor is the overrepresentation of immigrants in sec­
tors sensitive to economic cycles, such as construction and related industries or the 
service sector (oeCd, 2009). This overrepresentation corresponds to the poor labor 
conditions in these sectors. For example, the comparisons of labor conditions such as 
type of job (full or part time), type of contract (permanent or temporary), labor rela­
tions, on-the-job accidents, and wages among sectors in Spain indicate that the five 
groups of activity with the largest concentration of immigrant workers (construc­
tion, domestic services, agriculture, tourism, and the retail trade) have the worst labor 
conditions, and as a result, are among the least desirable activity groups for Spanish 
workers (Cachón, 1997). 
Other labor market factors might produce a significant and differential negative 
effect on immigrant employment relative to native employment: 1) the overrepre­
sentation of immigrants in temporary employment, since temporary employment 
falls rapidly in the early stages of economic crises (Holmlund and Storrie, 2002; Eu­
ropean Commission, 2011); 2) the overrepresentation of immigrants among workers 
who have less time at their current job. The “last-hired, first-fired” phenomenon is 
unfavorable to immigrants (Castles and Kosak, 1973; Papademetriou, Sumption, 
and Terrazas, 2010). The oeCd (2009: 25) recalls how “countries with the highest share 
of recent immigrants . . . are therefore more likely to witness a strong deterioration of 
immigrant labor market outcomes”; and the oeCd expressly included Spain among 
these countries; 3) the overrepresentation of immigrants in selective layoffs and 
discriminatory acts. Evidence of discrimination based on race or ethnic origin is sup­
ported by numerous studies. The oeCd (2008: 184) summarizes the effects of discri mi-
nation stating that “available evidence suggests that gender and racial discrimination 
in the labor market is still significant in a number of oeCd countries.” In the case of 
the U.s., the racial and ethnic classification system has consequences for Latino im­
migrants. Those with darker skin tones are more discriminated against in the labor 
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market, and their annual revenue is, on average, lower than those with lighter skin 
(Frank, Akresh, and Lu, 2010).
Another important question in the labor market is the overrepresentation of 
immigrants in the informal economy (oeCd, 2009). We note what Reyneri (1998) ar­
gues for Italy, “The informal economy has important and strong national roots to the 
point that it exerts a pull factor on immigrants from less developed countries, when 
the local labor pool does not accept work in marginal occupations.” This is also ap­
plicable to countries like Spain and the U.S. As Castles and Miller point out (2009: 
232­342), irregular migration and employment are the result not only of migrant dis ­
regard for national laws, but also of the emergence of a “new economy” in which 
workers are treated differently because of their ethnicity, race, origins, and legal sta­
tus. They argue that the lack of legal status is one of the sources of irregular employment 
of immigrants in Spain and the United States. The U.S. is a prime example, with over 
12 million irregular residents in 2008. Southern European countries like Spain with 
fast­growing economies up to 2008 recruited millions of irregular workers as a way 
of quickly meeting their labor­market demand (Castles and Miller, 2010).
Immigrants are overrepresented in groups with certain socio­demographic cha r­
acteristics that increase their vulnerability in the job market such as being young, 
women, persons with little education or low­skilled workers, or those less likely to 
speak a country’s predominant language. Immigrants in these groups are likely to lose 
their jobs during economic downturns (Orrenius and Zavodny, 2009; Papademetriou, 
Sumption, and Terrazas, 2010; European Commission, 2011). Immigrants’ increased 
vulnerability resulting from the deterioration of the labor market causes them to lose 
more jobs than natives during the crisis.
Other institutional factors are important sources of vulnerability, particularly 
the over­institutionalized requirements for immigrants, the additional family de­
mands on them, and some differences in access to social protection. The additional 
institutional requirements that migrant workers face (visas, work permits, certifica­
tions, etc.) motivate disparities in job search strategies between immigrants and na­
tives, with higher pressure on the former because sometimes status as an authorized 
migrant is linked to continued employment (Cachón, 2009). Immigrants often send 
part of their income to family members still living in the country of origin who de­
pend on these resources to lead a decent life and to raise their children. In addition, 
immigrants often pay their trip­related debts and the migration expenses of other 
family members. They also have lower access to social protection (e.g., unemploy­
ment insurance) or health care, and lower levels of union membership and awareness 
of employment and redundancy rights (tUC, 2008). These sources of vulnerability push 
them, when unemployed, to accept the first –frequently bad– job they find, exchanging 
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unemployment for underemployment. As Papademetriou and Terrazas argue (2009: 
iii), immigrants “may be able to adjust more quickly than native­born workers to 
changing labor market conditions because they are more amenable to changing jobs 
and their place of residence for work­related reasons.” These vulnerability features 
tend to produce worsening working conditions for immigrants relative to natives; 
however, the negative impact on aggregate immigrant employment would be lower 
compared to natives.
As a result, during an economic crisis different factors causing immigrant vul­
nerability have different effects on their employment opportunities compared to na­
tives. Factors such as immigrants’ position in the labor market, the conditions of 
their jobs, and their personal characteristics generally place them in worse condi­
tions than their native counterparts. On one hand, the economic crisis lowers the 
number of positions available in the job market for all, but on the other, the immi­
grants’ flexibility about accepting employment at a lower wage and of lower quality 
improves their level of employment compared to natives but worsens their working 
conditions.
In this article, we only focus on the overrepresentation of immigrants in eco­
nomic sectors sensitive to the economic cycle since this is a fundamental feature that 
explains the effects of the Great Recession on aggregate employment. We do not exam­
ine other adjustment mechanisms to labor demand such as wage freezes, short­term 
jobs, and renegotiating conditions of labor, which in some cases appeared to be alter­
natives to redundancy (Rogers, 2009). The effects of the crisis on immigrant employment 
will depend on the concentration of immigrants working in sectors highly sensitive 
to the economic cycle, such as construction, and not on less cyclical industries such as 
elder care, health care, domestic work, and agriculture. The United States and Spain 
are the two countries with the highest concentration of Latin American immigrants 
in the world, and in both countries the construction sector, highly sensitive to the 
economic cycle, has attracted new immigrant workers. Activity in the construction 
sector has weakened since the initial stage of the crisis, characterized by the housing 
crisis. It is particularly relevant that International Labor Organization (iLo) summa­
rizes the situation pointing out, “In countries where construction had been the en­
gine of growth in recent years such as Spain and the U.s., migrant workers employed 
in the sector have paid the highest price in terms of loss of employment” (Awad, 
2009: 55). The effects in these countries cannot be generalized to other destination 
countries where construction has played a key role in economic development. 
Our work centers on a comparative analysis. Although comparative studies have 
a long tradition in the social sciences and particularly in international migration 
studies, there are few comparative analyses of the current economic crisis on immigrant 
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employment in destination countries. The exceptions are the articles published by 
Papademetriou and colleagues (Papademetriou and Terrazas, 2009; Papademe triou, 
Sumption, and Terrazas, 2010), Awad (2009), Tilly (2011) or the recent book edited by 
Higley, Nieuwenhuysen, and Neerup (2011) comparing the U.s. and Australia. 
To compare Latino immigrants in the U.s. and Spain, we used data from two 
national labor force surveys: the Active Population Survey (Encuesta de Población 
Activa, epa) for Spain and the Current Population Survey (Cps) for the U.s. Because 
both collect demographic information characterizing the different population groups 
residing in the respective countries, they allow us to know the employment status of 
those populations at different points in time. Every three months, the epa collects 
information on socio­demographic characteristics (like nationality and citizenship) 
and labor market conditions (except wages and affiliation to social security) of all 
persons in Spain. It collects data on a representative sample of about 60 000 house­
holds (ine, 2011b). The Cps in the United States collects information every month on a 
representative sample of about 60 000 households. The Cps questionnaire includes 
socio­demographic variables (e.g., education, race, and ethnicity, etc.) and a long battery 
of questions on employment characteristics including wages and earnings, country of 
birth, length of stay, and citizenship status (bLs, 2011).
We must be aware that there are potential sources of bias in the analysis of data 
on immigrants at their destination: changes in the composition of the immigrant flow 
over time (Borjas, 1985, 1995), fluctuations in the characteristics of immigrants entering 
the labor force (Aslund and Rooth, 2007), return or transit migration to a third country 
(Constant and Massey, 2003), and immigrant naturalizations, which decrease the 
immigrant stock. As in other studies (Reyneri and Fullin, 2011), we assume that mi­
grants’ unobserved characteristics do not change significantly over time and that re­
turn migration is not a selective process.
This article focuses on labor market outcomes; therefore, our universe is the 
adult civilian population, people 16 and older at the time of the survey. The term 
“immigrant” is used differently in Spain and in the U.s. For the purpose of this ar­
ticle, an immigrant in Spain is a foreign­born person who does not have Spanish 
citizenship at the time of the survey. A Latino immigrant is one who is a national of 
a Latin American country. In the case of the U.s., an immigrant is defined as a person 
who is not born in the U.s. and is not a U.s. citizen at the time of the survey. A Latino 
immigrant in the U.s. self-identifies as Hispanic. For the reminder of the article, when 
we refer to immigrants or Latino immigrants, we are using these analytical and com­
parable definitions. When we refer to natives, Spanish or U.S. American, we are re­
ferring to citizens of Spain or the U.s., respectively, at the time of the survey regardless 
of their country of birth.
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The main focus of this article is immigrant vulnerability, which derives from their 
immigrant condition given the “discriminatory institutional framework” and their class 
condition as workers. The “segmented assimilation” produced in their process of 
integration to the recipient country is reflected in their occupations and positions in 
the segmented labor markets. These barriers and conditions result in the creation of 
“categorically unequal” social subjects. Therefore, immigrants appear to be relatively 
more vulnerable than natives to cyclical downturns. Although there could be other 
direct causes for their increased labor market vulnerability during economic crisis, 
their overrepresentation in sectors sensitive to the economic cycle is a key factor. The 
study of the composition and distribution of the immigrant labor force and particu­
larly of the Latino immigrant labor force before and during the Great Recession in the 
U.s. and Spain is the objective of this article. 
dIfferences between lAtIno ImmIgrAnts 
In spAIn And the unIted stAtes 
The U.s. and Spain are the two oeCd countries that received the most immigrants from 
2004 to 2008: 5.5 and 3.7 million, respectively (oeCd, 2010a). Spain leads the Europe­
an Union in the foreign­born proportion of their population at 12.3 percent in 2010 
(Eurostat, 2011) (with the exception of four small countries: Luxembourg, Lithuania, 
Estonia, and Cyprus). The U.s. and Spain have the highest number of immigrant 
workers from Latin America and the Caribbean: 11.3 million in the U.s. and 1.7 million 
in Spain in 2011. In both countries, migrants from Latin America and the Caribbean 
represent a high proportion of non­citizens: 58 percent of non­citizens in the U.s. 
and 37 percent in Spain.
There are notable differences in the processes that led to the concentration of 
Latino immigrants in these countries. We divide those differences into four catego­
ries: 1) historical and contemporary Latin American migration flows to the U.s. and 
Spain; 2) development and implementation of diverse immigration policies; 3) prox­
imity to Latin America and the country of origin; and 4) characteristics of migrant 
populations such as the male/female ratio, educational level, labor force activity 
rates, and sector of employment.
Immigrants from Latin America have been a key component of U.s. immigra­
tion since the late nineteenth century (Massey, 1995). Latin American immigrants 
were mainly Mexican workers responding to the changes taking place in the U.S. 
economy, which demanded large numbers of unskilled workers who could be hired at 
low wages (Portes and Bach, 1985). They were followed by other groups of Caribbean 
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migrants (e.g., Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Dominicans, among others), and later, during 
the 1970s, by more Mexicans as well as other Latinos (Durand and Massey, 2010; 
Massey and Pren, 2012). This migration flow, especially among Mexicans, has devel­
oped a fundamental characteristic: social capital, which facilitates the migration of 
members belonging to a social network (Massey and Aysa­Lastra, 2011). In the U.s., 
there were about 16.4 million immigrants, of whom about 53 percent were Latino in 
2001. In 2011 the number of immigrants had risen to 19.5 million, and 11.3 million of 
whom were Latino. The Latino population grew 31 percent, increasing their relative 
size to 58 percent of all immigrants in 2011.
By contrast, Latin American immigration to Spain is relatively recent and has 
occurred mainly in the last decade (Cachón, 2009; Reyneri and Fullin, 2011). The to­
tal number of immigrants increased almost fourfold, from 1.1 million in 2001 to 5.3 
million in 2011. The proportion of the immigrant population was 2.7 percent and 
rose to 11.4 percent. Immigrants with Latin American citizenship numbered 344 700 in 
2001 and 2 029 200 in 2011, which means that the Latino immigrant population in 
Spain multiplied almost six times in the first decade of the century. In 2001, 32 per­
cent of immigrants were Latino, and this figure grew to 39 percent in 2011. This is 
explained by an increased demand for low­skilled workers in the construction sector 
(mostly men) and in personal care services (mostly women) (Bernardi, Garrido, and 
Miyar, 2011).
Migration in the U.s. has a long tradition and in Spain, it is a recent phenomenon; 
as a consequence of diverse development of immigration over time in both coun­
tries, a relevant difference is the presence of second and third generations of Latino 
immigrants. This is important because the presence of settled co­ethnic networks in 
the host country has an impact on new immigrants’ labor market integration (on job 
search, on segregation in some industries, etc.).
The U.s. and Spain have implemented very different migration policies in the 
last decade. Until late 2004, Spain did not have a suitable policy device for managing 
immigrant flows. The result was clear: estimates of illegal immigrants in early 2005 
were around 1.2 million people, which accounted for about 40 percent of total im­
migration in Spain (Cachón, 2009: 143). The Alien Regulation (Reglamento de Extran-
jería) approved in late 2004 launched a set of mechanisms to manage the flows and 
marked the beginning of a change in the migration management model (Cachón, 
2009: 161­198). This regulation was updated in 2011 (González­Beilfuss, 2011). It was 
complemented by an extraordinary process that allowed the regularization of the 
status of more than 565 000 illegal immigrants. As a result, Spain witnessed a sub­
stantial change in the traditional model of strong, irregular immigration typical of 
southern Europe (Laparra and Cachón, 2008). By January 2011, estimates revealed 
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that there were approximately 250 000 undocumented immigrants, equivalent to 5 
percent of all foreigners in Spain. There has been no overall change in immigration 
policy in the U.s. since 1986 when the Immigration Reform and Control Act (irCa) 
was passed. irCa included amnesty for undocumented aliens; this was carried out as 
an extraordinary regularization process (Cbo, 2006). But there were substantial 
changes in 1990 (Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act), 1996 (Anti­
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act; Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act; Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act), 1997 (Nica­
raguan and Central American Relief Act), 2001 (the Uniting [and] Strengthening 
America [by] Providing Appropriate Tools Required [to] Intercept [and] Obstruct Te r-
rorism Act, known as the Patriot Act), 2004 (National Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Protection Act), 2005 (Real id Act), 2006 (Secure Fence Act), and 2010 (Bor­
der Security Act), as well as other administrative measures (e.g., deferred action 
policies). These restrictive regulations, centered on national security, have framed 
the actions of the federal government regarding immigration. In addition, adminis­
trative changes have drastically altered the way the state has shaped the public dis­
course and the dynamics of the Latin American migrant flow to the United States 
(Massey and Pren, 2012). Frustration with the current situation of millions of undocu­
mented aliens in the U.s. is remarkable. In 2011, there were 11 million unauthorized 
immigrants residing permanently in the U.s. (Passel and Cohn, 2011), and most 
were Latino immigrants.
Access to citizenship through naturalization processes is different in Spain and 
the United States. In Spain, the overall policy requires 10 years of continuous legal 
residency in the country to apply for citizenship. However, there is a special regime 
for Latin Americans and immigrants from countries or groups to which Spain has 
had relations in the past (e.g., the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, etc.). Latin Ameri­
can immigrants can apply for Spanish citizenship after two years of continuous legal 
residency in Spain (Alvarez, 2011). Between 2007 and 2011, 473 897 naturalizations 
were granted based on continuous legal residency, which is equivalent to 10 percent 
of the average annual number of immigrants for the period. Eighty­two percent of 
the naturalizations were granted to Latin American immigrants. The United States 
has different regimes according to the nature of immigration (labor, family reunifica­
tion, military, etc.). The overall regime specifies that immigrants (green card holders) 
can apply for citizenship after five years of continuous legal residency in the United 
States, and for those in family reunification programs, after three years. In 2010 
about 40 million foreign­born persons were living in the United States. Of those, 21.2 
million were from Latin America, and of those, 6.8 million (or 32.1 percent) were 
naturalized citizens. Between 2007 and 2011, 3 764 837 naturalizations and 5 395 024 
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legal permanent residencies were granted in the U.s. About 40 percent of naturaliza­
tions and legal permanent residencies were granted to Latin American immigrants.
Another difference is the proximity of Latin American countries to the U.s. and 
Spain. The U.s. has both a geographical and historical proximity to Latino immi­
grants. For example, Mexico shares a border with the U.s. as well as a long history 
dating back centuries. As with the U.s., Latino immigrants to Spain have historical 
proximity, but most importantly, cultural proximity, as the Spanish language helps 
facilitate the integration of Latino immigrants there. In the U.s., English poses a bar­
rier, rather than a facilitator, to their economic and social integration (Connor and 
Massey, 2010).
Latino immigrants to Spain and the U.s. differ by their national origin, male/fe­
male ratio, and educational levels. Most Latino immigrants in the United States were 
born in Mexico (57 percent), followed by other Central American (17 percent) or Carib­
bean (14 percent) countries. In contrast, most Latin Americans residing in Spain are 
from South American countries; those from Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and 
Argentina account for two-thirds of them (see Table 1). Differences in the sex composi­
tion of Latino immigrant populations in both countries for 2011 are striking. In Spain, 
54.8 percent are females vs. 31.5 percent in the U.S. Moreover, due to the rapid increase 
of immigration to Spain, the growth rate of female Latina migrants from 2001 to 2011 
was 560.3 percent (vs. 481 percent for the males). Over the same 10­year period in the 
U.s., the female population grew by 20.8 percent, vs. 35.5 percent for the males. Our 
estimates using epa and Cpsn data indicate that the educational level of economically 
active Latino immigrants in Spain is somewhat higher than in the U.s. In Spain, they 
have an average of 11.3 years of schooling, compared to 12.5 years among the native 
Spanish population; Latino immigrants in the U.s. have an average of 10.9 years of 
schooling, compared with 14.3 years among U.S. Americans.
Another relevant difference is the growth rate of the Latino immigrant flow in 
both countries. Over the last decade (2001­2011), the volume of Latino immigrants 
in the population in general and in the labor market in particular has grown in both 
countries, but at different speeds. The Latino immigrant labor force in Spain has in­
creased fivefold, and in 2011 amounted to 6.7 percent of the total workforce. In the 
U.S., their numbers grew about 30 percent, and in 2011 they accounted for 5.2 per­
cent of the total workforce.
20
María aysa-Lastra and Lorenzo CaChón
norteaMériCa
Table 1
DISTRIBUTION OF LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS IN SPAIN 
AND THE UNITED STATES BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN (2011)
spAIn unIted stAtes
% 
of Latin 
Americans
Growth Rate 
in the Last Decade
2001-2011
% 
of Latin 
Americans
Growth Rate 
in the Last Decade 
2001-2011
Total Number of
Latin Americans
1 650 243 289.6% 12 086 358 24.5%
Country of Origin
Ecuador 21.8 158.3 1.1 30.5
Colombia 16.5 211.6 1.6 16.0
Bolivia 12.0 2 889.8 0.2 31.4
Peru 8.0 277.1 0.9 38.5
Argentina 7.3 270.1 0.4 35.8
Brazil 6.5 526.0 0.9 62.6
Dominican Republic 5.5 190.9 2.4 8.9
Paraguay 5.3 N.A. 0.0 N.A.
Venezuela 3.6 259.,3 0.4 48.5
Cuba 3.3 121.8 1.9 9.4
Uruguay 2.6 523.6 0.1 92.1
Chile 2.5 257.3 0.3 8.4
Honduras 1.9 N.A. 1.1 52.7
Mexico 1.5 236.7 38.3 23.1
Source: Spain: INE, 2011a; Grieco and Trevelyan, 2010; authors’ estimates.
The labor force activity rates of native and Latino immigrant populations differ 
between the two countries as well. In 2011, 57.4 percent of Spaniards participated in 
the labor force, while 63.7 percent of U.S. Americans were active. It is important to 
note, however, that U.S. Americans’ activity rate dropped 2.9 points in the last decade, 
while the Spanish rate increased by 5.3 points. This increase in Spain is due to the 
growing incorporation of Spanish women into the labor market and to higher activity 
among immigrants. Latino immigrants have higher activity rates than the native 
populations in both countries but with notable differences. In the U.S., their labor 
force activity rate is 70.5 percent (and remained stable over the last decade), while in 
Spain, it is 83.3 percent (and increased 5 points in this period). The higher activity rate 
of Latino immigrants in Spain is due to the very different behavior of Latino immi­
grant women, as immigrant men have similar rates in both countries (approximately 
86­87 percent): while Latina immigrants in the U.S. have a participation rate of 50 
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percent (lower than U.S. American women), in Spain, they rate reached 81 percent 
(30 points higher than Spanish women) (see Table 2). This high activity rate of Latinas 
in Spain shows that they migrated with their own labor migration projects and that 
they have found opportunities in sectors traditionally been occupied by women, such 
as services, specifically domestic service. Moreover, in Spain, the majority of women 
who migrate for family reunification can obtain a work permit. Latina immigrants’ 
lower participation in the labor market in the U.s. compared to Spain may be explained 
by their characterization as tied migrants (most coming for family reunification) and 
having young children in the household, among other obstacles (Granberry and Mar­
celli, 2011). Despite these differences in both destination countries, the crisis has had 
rather similar effects on the employment of recent Latino immigrants.
Table 2
LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRANT ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION 
IN SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (2001 AND 2011)
spAIn unIted stAtes
2011
Relative Variation
2001-2011 2011
Relative Variation
2001-2011
Absolute Numbers 1 542 400 1 294 400 7 971 118 1 862 925
Distribution by Gender (%)
Total 100.0 521.9 100.0 30.5
Males 45.2 481.0 68.5 35.5
Females 54.8 560.3 31.5 20.8
Distribution by Educational Level (%)
Elementary and Lower 18.7 411.9 24.0 -1.7
Middle School 23.9 754.2 16.8 52.0
High School 38.4 560.4 41.2 40.2
College and Higher 19.0 399.1 17.9 53.1
Activity Rates by Gender (%)
Total 83.3 6.7 70.5 -0.3
Males 86.1 -5.0 87.3 -0.4
Females 81.2 17.5 49.7 -3.3
Activity Rates by Educational Level (%)
Elementary and Less 76.3 -1.1 64.4 -5.3
Middle School 79.6 9.8 67.7 4.7
High School 87.3 7.7 74.2 -0.1
College and Higher 88.5 12.2 74.2 -0.3
Source: Spain: ine, 2011b (first quarters). United States: bls, 2011. Authors’ estimates.
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The activity rate by educational level reflects two behavioral patterns. First, in 
both countries, Latinos’ activity rates have a positive relationship to education: the 
higher the educational level, the higher their activity rates. In addition, in the case of 
Spain, Latinos’ activity rates are higher at all educational levels (see Table 2). The diffe r-
ence in the overall activity rates for Latino immigrants in the U.s. and Spain is partially 
explained by two factors. First, the higher educational level of Latino immigrants in 
Spain vs. Latino immigrants in the United States; and second, the higher levels of female 
participation among Latino immigrants in the Spanish labor market.
The sectoral and occupational distribution of Latino immigrants in the two coun­
tries is quite different; but in both, they are concentrated in low-skilled jobs. Before 
the 2008 crisis in the U.s., Latino men were concentrated in construction (26 percent), 
services (27 percent), production (12 percent), and transportation (11 percent) jobs, while 
Latino women were employed in services (48 percent) and production (15 percent). 
Both sexes also worked in agriculture (around 5 percent). The arrival of Latinos to 
nontraditional settlement areas in the U.S. has diversified their presence in the different 
sectors (Parrado and Kandel, 2008). In Spain, Latino men were concentrated in the 
construction (27 percent), services (56 percent), and industrial (10 percent) sectors, 
while Latina women were employed almost exclusively in the service sector (93 percent). 
Moreover, due to the important Latino immigrant growth in the last decade, their 
presence is increasing in a growing number of groups of activities (Cachón, 2009).
Our estimations indicate that the timing of the effects of the Great Recession in 
both countries also differs. Latino immigrants to the U.s. are more sensitive to the 
economic cycle, as their participation in the labor market has declined since the first 
year of the crisis (2008). From 2008 to 2011, the number of active Latino migrants fell 
by 1.1 million. By contrast, the flow of Latinos entering the labor market in Spain 
continued to rise during the first year of the crisis and only began to decline in 2009 
and did so to a lesser extent than in the U.s.
The U.s. and Spain will continue to be countries of immigration and the most im­
portant destinations for Latin American migrants. If we look beyond the current crisis, 
we must point out that both countries will continue to need more immigrants, and immi­
grants’ sensitivity to labor market conditions should be considered a factor in framing 
immigration policies that facilitate their return and/or embrace their integration.
economIc downturn And lAtIno ImmIgrAnt employment
The third quarter of 2008 marked the starting point for the decline in employment in 
the United States and Spain. It lasted nine quarters in the U.s. –because in the fourth 
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quarter of 2010 employment grew again, although marginally; five quarters later, 
the gdp began its recovery. In Spain, it has lasted at least 13 quarters –because in third 
quarter 2011, employment continued to decline–, and although the gdp began a mild 
recovery in the second quarter of 2010, the economic forecast for 2012 again projects 
negative growth and further declines in employment (see Figure 1).
The last decade can be divided into two distinct periods: expansion until 2007 
and crisis starting in 2008 (overlooking the brief 2002 crisis, more important in the 
U.s. than in Spain). In the expansion period, between 2000 and 2008, the U.s. em­
ployed population grew at an average annual rate of 0.8 percent (or 1.1 million peo­
ple each year); in Spain, it grew at an annual average of 4.4 percent (or 0.7 million 
people each year) (see Table 3). Employment among Latino immigrants, in particular, 
in the U.S. grew on average 3.9 percent annually (a high figure for a country with an 
initial high level of immigration). In Spain, the volume of Latino immigrants employed 
grew at an average annual rate of 145 percent, the highest recorded in Spanish history. 
The case of Spain is unique and exceptional among developed countries in this decade 
due to the remarkable increase in immigration, from low to high, both in absolute and 
relative terms. This growth responds to an expansive phase of the economic cycle 
and is closely linked to the important expansion of the construction and other sectors 
such as domestic service and tourism. These sectors demand abundant unskilled 
laborers. The native Spanish workforce has higher educational levels and skills but 
the Spanish labor market demanded unskilled workers (Cachón, 2002). The Spanish 
labor market demand and the native labor supply were mismatched. Moreover, this 
period coincides with political and economic crisis in some of the migrant­origin 
countries (e.g., Colombia, Ecuador, and Rumania).
In the three years of crisis (2008­2011), employment in Spain has fallen more sharply 
than in the U.S.: 3.7 percent on average annually (an average loss of 750 000 jobs per 
year) compared to 1.4 percent in the U.s. Despite this difference, both countries display 
a consistent pattern: the largest decline in employment occurred among immigrants, 
particularly Latino immigrants. The average annual decline for both all immigrants and 
Latino migrants in the U.S. is 2.6 percent. In Spain, this figure rises dramatically to 5.8 
percent among all immigrants and 6.7 percent among Latino immigrants (see Table 3).
Immigrant employment in Spain started to drop one year after native employ­
ment began to decrease (contrary to the U.s. experience). After the first year of the 
crisis, in 2009, immigrant employment decreased rapidly in absolute and relative terms 
compared to natives. There are factors that explain why immigrant employment 
was more resilient during the first year of the crisis and then subsequently rapidly 
decreased. Vulnerable workers, like the immigrants and Latino immigrants in Spain, 
are often employed in labor­intensive work. Their lower “social bargaining power” 
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(Cachón 2002) make it difficult for them to resist employers’ pressure to increase 
hours and otherwise intensify work, and for this reason they are preferred in certain 
sectors. However, this ability to resist is correspondingly lower during periods of 
rising unemployment (Rogers, 2009). Another factor that may explain this delayed 
response in Spain is the mismatch between qualifications and jobs held by immi­
grants. This mismatch facilitates their occupational mobility and search for jobs dif­
ferent from those they held before the crisis. A third factor is the increased willingness 
to migrate to other towns and cities, especially during the early years of their stay. 
Their flexibility and mobility enables them to search widely for employment oppor­
tunities in different sectors. Nonetheless, these search strategies have limits, includ­
ing the lack of employment opportunities when the labor market is in a deep crisis, 
as has been the case in Spain since 2009. 
Table 3
EMPLOYED POPULATION IN SPAIN AND THE U.S. BEFORE AND AFTER THE CRISIS 
BY IMMIGRATION EXPERIENCE AND REGION OF ORIGIN
Year
spAIn unIted stAtes
Total Immigrant
Latino 
Immigrant Total Immigrant
Latino 
Immigrant
            Employed Population (thousands)
2000 15 119.3 379.4 110.2 136 053.8 10 613.7 5 830.8
2008 20 402.3 2 941.1 1 387.8 145 108.3 12 884.3 7 667.4
2011 18 151.7 2 430.0 1 110.7 138 962.2 11 863.6 7 060.8
            Absolute Average Annual Change (thousands)
2000-2008 660.4 320.2 159.7 1 131.8 283.8 229.6
2008-2011 -750.2 -170.4 -92.4 -2 048.7 -340.2 -202.2
            Average Annual Percentage Change 
2000-2008 4.4 84.4 144.9 0.8 2.7 3.9
2008-2011 -3.7 -5.8 -6.7 -1.4 -2.6 -2.6
Source: Spain: ine, 2011b (first quarters). United States: bls, 2011. Authors’ estimates.
Together, the three years of crisis have resulted in an employment drop of 11 
percent in Spain and 7 percent in the U.s. They have produced a decline in immi­
grant employment of 17 percent and 10 percent, respectively, in the two countries in 
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the same period, a drop that rises to 20 percent among Latino immigrants in Spain and 
9 percent in the U.s. The figures for the U.S. were lowest in 2010, but since then the 
country has begun a process of slow employment recovery (see Table 4). The em­
ployment of immigrants in general and of Latino immigrants in particular is more 
sensitive to economic cycles in both countries: it grows faster during economic ex­
pansion and declines faster during periods of economic contraction (Orrenius and 
Zavodny, 2009). One key feature to explain the increased vulnerability of immi­
grants during the Great Recession is their concentration in sectors sensitive to the 
economic cycle. 
Table 4 shows the distribution of employed immigrants and employed Latino 
immigrants in the years 2008 and 2011 by sector and the percentage change in their 
participation from 2008 to 2011. Columns two to four in Table 4 show percentage 
change of the total, immigrant, and Latino immigrant employed population by sec­
tor between 2008 and 2011. We observe some common features. The first and most 
important is the remarkable decline in employment in the construction sector, which 
quadruples the overall drop in employment in both countries. In Spain, employ­
ment plummeted 44 percent for this sector’s population; it declined by 24 percent in 
the U.s., and the figure was even higher, 29 percent, between 2007 and 2010. For Latino 
immigrants, the decline in employment in construction has been 58 percent in Spain 
and 42 percent in the U.s. The burst of the housing bubble is responsible for the 
employment collapse in the construction sector. This collapse has been widespread 
in Spain, and particularly in Andalucía, Murcia, Valencia, and Canarias, where the 
housing bubble was linked to tourism. In the U.s., its most severe impact was in 
the initial stages of the crisis, and its main effects on the housing market have been 
concentrated in certain states such as Florida, California, and Nevada. Despite mas­
sive lay-offs, many employers are trying to keep core workers (Rogers 2009); immi­
grants, however, are concentrated in peripheral segments within the construction 
sector. Due to the slim prospect of a significant recovery in this sector, construction 
companies have not applied internal measures (e.g., reduced hours for all workers) 
alternative to lay-offs. Moreover, due to the multiplier effect in related sectors, the true 
impact of the burst of the housing bubble is larger than what these figures reflect. In 
addition to job losses in the construction sector, we must consider collapses in branches 
of industry and services related to building, such as suppliers and vendors. The fall of 
employment in construction and related industries has had negative effects on the 
employment of male immigrants in Spain (Domingo, Gil, and Galizia, 2010) and the U.S. 
(Engemann and Wall, 2010).
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Table 4
PERCENTAGE CHANGE OF THE EMPLOYED POPULATION 
AND THEIR PARTICIPATION BY SECTOR, IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE, 
AND REGION OF ORIGIN FOR SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (2008 TO 2011)
Total Immigrants
Latino 
Immigrants
Immigrant 
Weight*
Latino 
Immigrant 
Weight*
Immigrant 
Weight*
Latino 
Immigrant 
Weight*
Relative Change (%, 2008-2011) 2008 2011
Spain
Total -11.0 -17.4 -20.0 14.4 6.8 13.4 6.1
Agriculture -9.3 6.4 3.6 18.3 5.5 21.5 6.2
Manufacturing -23.3 -37.9 -53.2 10.5 4.3 8.5 2.6
Construction -44.1 -56.4 -58.1 25.3 11.4 19.7 8.6
Services -1.6 -0.5 -2.8 13.0 6.6 13.1 6.5
United States  
Total -7.0 -9.8 -9.1 8.9 5.3 8.6 5.2
Agriculture -1.3 -6.8 -6.3 16.9 16.2 16.0 15.4
Manufacturing -14.1 -15.7 -15.8 10.7 6.5 10.5 6.4
Construction -22.4 -24.6 -27.4 18.9 16.0 18.3 15.0
Services -4.7 -5.4 0.7 7.6 3.9 7.5 4.1
* Relative weight of immigrants and Latino immigrants vis-à-vis the total population
Source: Spain: ine, 2011b (first quarters). United States: bls, 2011. Authors’ estimates.
Manufacturing employment dropped by 23 percent in Spain (due to the decline 
in manufacturing) and 14 percent in the U.s. between 2008 and 2011. The erosion of 
employment is noteworthy among Latino immigrants: in Spain, they lost 53 percent 
of industrial jobs (double the average decline) and 16 percent in the U.s., and the 
figure was even higher, 27 percent, between 2007 and 2010.
The overall decline in services is 1.6 percent and 4.7 percent for Spain and the 
U.s., respectively. These figures reflect both job losses in some service sectors and 
creation in others. For example, Spain lost jobs in sectors such as trade, tourism, trans ­
portation, and services linked to real estate, and it gained employment in branches 
like health care and social services. Nonetheless, the decline in the service sector for 
Latino immigrants is 2.8 percent in Spain. During the most recent stage of the Great 
Recession, linked to the debt crisis and to restrictions in government expenditures, 
employment in public administration, health care, and social services has also de­
creased. In the U.s., the declines are greater for immigrants than for the total population, 
but Latino immigrants actually made marginal gains (0.7 percent) during the period. 
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In other words, Latino immigrants have been affected by job losses in the service sec-
tors between 2008 and 2011 in Spain, but in the U.s. this decrease has affected non-
Latino immigrants.
Immigrant employment in agriculture in the U.s. and Spain is a special case, to 
say the least, for three reasons. One, the U.s. and Spain are among the developed 
countries where immigrants are overrepresented in this sector. Two, it is the only 
sector where the contraction is different: in Spain, it contracted by 9.3 percent be­
tween 2008 and 2011, while in the U.s. it remained almost constant, with a marginal 
decline of 1 percent. Three, while there is an overall decline in Spain, we observe an 
increase in the employment of immigrants and Latino immigrants (about 4 percent 
for the latter); this contrasts with what happened in the U.s., where employment in 
agriculture remains stable, but the number of immigrants and Latino immigrants em­
ployed decreased in this sector (by about 6 percent for Latinos). Agriculture might 
be considered a “shelter sector” for immigrants in Spain. The same happened in the 
United Stated between 2007 and 2010. In this period, immigrant employment in agri­
culture grew 3 percent and the employment of Latino immigrants grew 4 percent.
The comparison of employment among the entire workforce, immigrants, and 
Latino immigrants explains the change in the proportion that Latino immigrant em­
ployment has by sector. The proportion of Latino immigrant employment increased 
in agriculture in Spain and registered a marginal decrease in the U.s. It remained 
constant in the service sector in both countries. It decreased in manufacturing in Spain 
and was stable in the U.s. And above all, it registered a large decline in the construc­
tion sector in Spain and a mild decline in the U.s. (after the recovery of the sector in 
2011, because until 2010 the decline in immigrant and Latino immigrant employment 
was substantial).
In 2011, immigrants accounted for 13.4 percent of total employment in Spain 
and 8.6 percent in the U.s.; in agriculture, 22 percent in Spain and 16 percent in the 
U.s.; and in construction, 20 percent in Spain and 18 percent in the U.s. Immigrants 
have less weight in manufacturing and services. However, these sectors have groups 
of activities in which the presence of immigrants vary (e.g., it is limited in the auto­
mobile industry but abundant in the domestic sector).
In 2011, the weight of Latino immigrants by sector differed considerably in the 
two countries. In Spain, they accounted for 6 percent of total employment, 9 percent 
of construction, 7 percent of services, 6 percent of agriculture, and only 3 percent of 
manufacturing. However, in the U.S., Latino immigrants represented 5 percent of total 
employment, 15 percent of the agricultural sector, 15 percent of construction, 6 per­
cent of manufacturing, and only 4 percent of the service sector (see Table 4). The high 
concentration of Latino immigrants in the U.S. in construction and agriculture is re­
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lated to the sex composition of the immigrant flow and the differences in the activity 
rates of Latino male and female immigrants. 
Figure 2 shows trends over time in the proportion of employed immigrants and 
Latino immigrants compared to the total employed population. For the U.S., it shows 
the profile of an immigration country that is “mature” compared to Spain. Spain start­
ed the decade with a low level of immigration and received a large influx particu­
larly from Latin America. Before the crisis, the weight of immigrants in the U.s. grew 
moderately and steadily from 7.8 percent in 2000 to 9.2 percent in 2007. In contrast, 
Spain has experienced remarkable growth, from 2.5 percent in 2000 to 14.4 percent 
in 2008. Until 2005, immigrants accounted for a greater weight of the population in the 
U.s.; since then, the weight of immigration in overall employment is higher in Spain. 
The outstanding expansion of employed immigrants in Spain did not happen at the 
expense of Spanish workers; annual employment increased at an average rate of 2.4 per­
cent between 2000 and 2007. It can even be said that Spanish employment grew more 
than ever and continuously during this period of rapid immigrant labor migration 
and immigrant employment growth.
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Figure 2
PERCENT OF THE TOTAL EMPLOYED POPULATION REPRESENTED 
BY EMPLOYED IMMIGRANTS AND EMPLOYED LATINO IMMIGRANTS 
IN SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, 2000 TO 2011
Source: Spain: INE, 2011b (first quarters). United States: bls, 2011. Authors’ estimates.
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The evolution of Latino employment is similar to that of overall immigrant em­
ployment in the U.s. Its weight grew from 4.3 percent of the population in 2000 to 5.6 
percent in 2007, while in Spain it went from 0.7 percent in 2000 to 6.8 percent in 2008. 
Since 2006, Latinos have gained greater relative importance among those employed 
in Spain than in the U.s. The weight of immigrants in general and Latino immigrants 
among workers began to decline at the onset of the crisis in 2007 in the U.s. and in 
2008 in Spain. This decline is explained by the greater sensitivity of immigrant em­
ployment to economic cycles. The growing distances between the weight of immi­
grant and Latino immigrants in the Spanish labor market after 2003­2004 is not due to 
a decline in the number of Latino immigrants, but to an increase in the number of arrivals 
of other immigrants. Ruma nian immigrants began arriving in Spain in 2003, and 
currently they are the country’s largest immigrant group. At the end of 2011, 913 000 
Rumanians were living in Spain. This increase is linked to Rumania’s entry into the 
European Union in 2007 and the free circu lation of Rumanian citizens, their settlement, 
and the construction of social networks in Spain.
As we have shown, despite the differences between the Spanish and U.s. econo­
mies, the historical differences in immigration from Latin America to both countries, 
the diverse types of proximity between Latin America and the U.S. and Spain, and 
marked differences in the demographic characteristics of Latino immigrants (e.g., 
country of origin, sex composition, and education), the effects of the Great Recession 
on immigrant Latino employment have similar features and reflect employment vul­
nerability during the current economic downturn. The employment vulnerability of 
Latino immigrants is linked to their presence in sectors more sensitive to economic 
cycles, particularly in construction and in some activity groups of the manufacturing 
and service sectors. On the contrary, agriculture has been a shelter for immigrant 
employment in both countries, at least in one stage of the current crisis. This large im­
pact of the Great Recession on Latino employment in both countries is also reflected 
in increasing unemployment among immigrants and Latino immigrants. 
lAtIno ImmIgrAnt unemployment
In 2007, Spain’s unemployment rate was 8.5 percent, the lowest it had been in the 
last 30 years. At the time, it was similar to the German unemployment rate and only 
1.4 points above the average of the European Union’s 27 member countries. Spain 
was experiencing, for the first time since the crisis of the 1970s, a labor market with 
close to full employment, and Spain’s rate of unemployment almost matched the 
non­accelerating wage rate of unemployment (nawrU) (European Commission, 2008). 
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Only the young, women, and immigrants had unemployment rates above 10 percent. 
This quasi-ideal condition in the labor market was produced for the first time in 
Spain’s modern history in the midst of high volume immigration. However, the Eu­
ropean –particularly the Spanish– unemployment rates were higher than that of the 
U.s., which was 4.5 percent, very close to its lowest rate in the last 30 years (which 
was 4 percent in 2000). But the economic blackout produced by the crisis has dramati­
cally increased unemployment figures.
Before the 2007 crisis, the situation of Latino immigrants was different in both 
countries. In the U.s., their unemployment rate was only 0.9 points higher than the 
national average, while in Spain it was 11.6 percent (3.1 points higher than the average). 
That is, Latino immigrants in Spain entered the crisis with unemployment rates sig­
nificantly higher than those of the natives.
Before the crisis, in most developed countries immigrants’ unemployment rates 
were higher than those of natives. The gap between immigrant and native employ­
ment has increased despite the arguments pointed out by some researchers (Tilly, 2011). 
For example, data from Eurostat (2012) show that only Belgium and Greece had 
unemployment rates among natives that were higher than those of foreigners before 
the crisis (fourth trimester of 2007). For the eU­27, foreigners had an unemployment 
rate 4.8 points higher than that of natives (and 0.5 in the U.s.). These data also show 
that the unemployment gap between immigrant workers and natives has increased 
between 2007 and 2011 in 14 of the 18 countries for which data is available –the ex­
ceptions are Germany, Luxemburg, the United Kingdom, and the Czech Republic. 
For the eU­27 zone, the unemployment gap has increased by 2.7 points, vs. 0.7 
points in the U.S. In some European countries the gap increase has been moderate, 
but in others such as Sweden or Spain the unemployment gap between immigrants 
and natives has doubled; in other countries (Greece, Denmark, or the Netherlands), 
it has increased by more than 50 percent. In almost all other countries the gap has 
increased over 15 percent, which is the increase in the United States. Although fig­
ures vary by countries of origin and destination, the general trend clearly shows in­
creased immigrant vulnerability in terms of the unemployment rate during the crisis. 
Reyneri (2009) has pointed out that the unemployment gap is a phenomenon that 
affects male immigrants. The widening of the unemployment gap in Spain corre­
sponds to this dominant pattern and shows increased immigrant vulnerability dur­
ing the crisis and how it has increased since 2007 as result of the Great Recession and 
immigrant job loss. However, immigrant unemployment is linked to the loss of jobs 
and to immigrants’ entries and exits from the host country’s labor market.
Between 2007 and 2011, the Spanish unemployment rate increased 2.5 times, 
and the U.s. rate doubled, raising unemployment rates to 21.3 percent and 10.2 per­
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cent, respectively. The rates for Latino immigrants have increased 2.4 times in Spain 
and 2.7 times in the U.s., meaning that, for Latino immigrants, they increased to 28 
percent in Spain (2011) and 14.4 percent in the U.s. (2010). In summary, the crisis had 
very similar effects in both countries on the unemployment of Latino immigrants, 
though their rates began at different levels and the increase in the jobless gap is 
higher in Spain. Moreover, in 2011, the overall unemployment rate in the U.s. de­
clined one point and three points for recent Latino immigrants, confirming the high­
er sensitivity of immigrant employment to the economic cycles (see Table 5).
Table 5
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT BY 
IMMIGRANT EXPERIENCE AND REGION OF ORIGIN FOR SPAIN 
AND THE UNITED STATES (2007-2011)
Unemployment Rate
Relative Weight in 
Unemployment
(%)
Total Immigrant
Latino 
Immigrant Immigrant
Latino 
Immigrant
Spain
2007 8.5 12.6 11.6 20.6 9.0
2008 9.6 14.6 13.6 23.2 10.0
2009 17.4 28.4 26.6 26.4 11.2
2010 20.0 30.8 28.6 24.5 10.2
2011 21.3 32.0 28.0 23.3 8.8
United States
2007 4.5 5.0 5.4 10.2 6.7
2008 5.2 7.6 8.7 13.1 9.2
2009 9.0 11.3 14.3 10.9 8.3
2010 10.2 12.4 14.4 10.4 7.5
2011 9.2 10.4 11.4 9.8 6.5
Source: Spain: ine, 2011b (first quarters). United States: bls, 2011. Authors’ estimates.
There are three significant differences in the evolution of Latino immigrant un­
employment in both countries. The first is the timing of how their employment re­
sponded during the first year of the crisis. In the U.s., it has declined since the 
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beginning of the crisis. However, in Spain, the decline was delayed until the third 
quarter of 2008, one year after it began dropping overall for the Spanish population. 
The opposite occurred in the U.s.: the first to lose their jobs were Latino immigrants, 
who in 2008 recorded greater increases in the jobless rate than the total population. 
A large proportion of Latinos worked in construction, and this sector showed the 
first signs of a weakening economy –as in 2006– before the crisis. The second varia­
tion is the different weight of immigrant unemployment in overall unemployment: 
23.3 percent in Spain vs. 9.8 percent in the U.s. However, the weight of Latino jobless­
ness vis-à-vis total unemployment in both countries is lower and similar: 8.8 percent 
for Spain and 6.5 percent for the U.s. in 2011 (see Table 3). A third factor distinguishing 
the two countries is the fact that a significant flow of new immigrant workers con­
tinued to arrive to Spain despite the sharp fall in employment since 2008. The growth 
of the Latino immigrant population participating in the labor market between 2007 
and 2009 explains about 64 percent of their unemployment in 2009.
To understand the continued arrival of economic migrants to Spain after the 
onset of the crisis, it is important to remember that, as with other social phenomena, 
migrations will continue for a period of time even if the main and original attraction 
factors (e.g., employment opportunities) that motivate them have disappeared. Im­
migration is structurally extremely difficult to reduce (Massey, Durand, and Malone, 
2002). Immigration’s inertia is related to the following factors, among others: 1) the 
mechanisms behind the cumulative causation of migration take a long time to cease; 
2) the push factors in origin (at least in comparative terms) last; and 3) immigrant 
agency and the immigration industries develop over time and further facilitate im­
migration (Castles, 2004). Furthermore, immigration has been enhanced by a remark­
able increase in the number of family reunifications. This is relevant economically 
because once in Spain, immigrants’ family members can apply for work permits and 
enter the labor market. Family reunification processes and the facilitation of immigrants’ 
entry into the labor market explain in part the continuing inflow of immigrants to 
Spain during the first year of the crisis, and only in the second year did the immigrant 
growth rate drop significantly. 
Tilly (2011) points out that comparisons of native and immigrant unemploy­
ment during the recession show little added migrant marginalization in terms of the 
unemployment rate. However, data from the U.s. and most European Union coun­
tries –above all Spain– show that for immigrants and particularly Latino immi­
grants, their position in the labor market has significantly worsened as a consequence 
of the Great Recession in terms of job loss, increased prevalence of unemployment 
among this group, and a growing unemployment gap vis-à-vis natives. This last expla­
nation is consistent with what other authors and the oeCd have summarized (2009).
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conclusIons
There is an academic debate about whether economic crises affect immigrant or na­
tive employment more. The data reviewed in this article for Latino immigrants in the 
U.s. and Spain during the Great Recession show that immigrant employment in gener­
al, and employment for immigrant Latinos in particular, is becoming more vulnerable 
during the crisis than native employment. Despite the differences in immigration 
flows and policies in the U.s. and Spain, the impact of the crisis on immigrants and 
Latino immigrants is quite similar in both countries.
Increased immigrant vulnerability derives from their condition as immigrants 
given the “discriminatory institutional framework” and their working class status. 
The segmented assimilation that arises from their unequal integration into the host 
society is mirrored in their occupations and positions in the segmented labor markets, 
which ultimately results in immigrants being “categorically unequal.” This condition 
is produced by a diversity of factors and in this text we have specifically analyzed 
one of them: immigrant and Latino immigrant overrepresentation in sectors most 
vulnerable in the event of economic recession, such as construction. However, other 
factors also exacerbate their vulnerability in the labor market such as their overrep­
resentation in temporary jobs; non-tenure jobs; selective and discriminatory layoffs; 
participation in the informal economy; overrepresentation among the young popu­
lation and those with lower educational levels; institutional factors, including the 
additional requirements from the “institutional discriminatory framework”; additional 
demands from their families in countries of origin; and some differences in access to 
social protection.
The U.s. and Spain are the two most important destination countries for Latin 
American migrants. The most significant differences between these two countries 
involve historical developments, as well the composition and timing of their immi­
gration flows, immigration policies and the different types of proximity to Latin Amer­
ica. Some differences exist regarding their labor markets as well, such as sensitivity 
to economic cycles, the sectoral distribution of Latinos, their educational assets, and 
the Latina women’s high labor market participation in Spain.
Despite these differences, the Great Recession has had similar effects on Latino 
immigrant employment in both countries. Our work shows its sensitivity to eco­
nomic cycles. The collapse of the construction industry has been a key factor in both 
countries. Relative loss of jobs in this sector is four times higher than job loss in the 
labor market in general, acutely affecting Latino immigrant employment, which fell 
in this sector by 58 percent in Spain and 42 percent in the U.s. during the crisis. 
Moreover, due to the multiplier effect in the construction-related activities groups, 
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the total impact of the housing bubble’s burst is greater than these figures reflect. The 
loss of industrial employment is also important for Latino immigrants in both coun­
tries, but especially in Spain. Conversely, agriculture served as a “shelter sector” for 
Latino immigrants in both countries in one stage of the crisis. The largest negative 
impact on employment in both countries has been on Latino immigrant males, because 
they have a higher presence in the activities and the sectors most affected by the Great 
Recession in both the U.s. and in Spain.
Immigrants’ vulnerability, and particularly that of Latino immigrants, is reflected 
in their unemployment rates. Both countries began the recession with very different 
levels of unemployment but Latino rates were higher than those of natives, with a small 
gap in the U.s. but a larger one in Spain. Between 2007 and 2010, unemployment rates 
more than doubled both in Spain and the U.s. Moreover, the differences in unem­
ployment rates between Latino immigrants and natives have increased significantly 
as a result of the crisis. The rate for Latino immigrants reached 28 percent in Spain 
(2011) and 14.4 percent in the U.S. (2010). The weight of Latino immigrant unemploy­
ment in total unemployment is quite similar in both countries: for every 100 people 
without jobs, in Spain, nine are Latino immigrants and in the U.S., seven are.
The two countries display two particularly significant differences: first, the dis­
similar behavior of Latino immigrant employment during the first year of the crisis. 
In the U.S., Latino immigrant employment declined more than native employment, 
showing a higher sensitivity to the economic crisis. In Spain, although we observe drops 
in native employment, immigrant and Latino immigrant employment continue to 
increase during the first year of the crisis, but starting in the second year, the decline in 
immigrant and Latino immigrant employment is larger than that of the native popula­
tion. Second, between 2006 and 2007 in the U.S., the growth of the foreign­born population 
slowed and between 2007 and 2008 it was negative, indicating return migration for 
that year. However, the flow of economic immigrants to Spain persisted, although the 
numbers of new immigrants declined relative to the years of economic expansion. Since 
the new arrivals were not finding jobs, the unemployment rate among this group 
rose. The growth in unemployment (approximately 64 percent) among immigrants in 
Spain is primarily due to swelling numbers of Latino immigrants arriving there after 
the start of the Great Recession. In this article we have analyzed some facts that can 
explain these trends.
This analysis has identified areas for future research that would advance our 
knowledge on the effects of economic downturns on immigrant employment. The 
analyses of changing employment conditions and job quality are critical, and variables 
such as wages, working hours, and overtime for immigrants should be compared to 
those for natives in the U.s. and Spain (Rogers, 2009). The statistical sources used in 
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this article and others include variables that allow the evaluation of qualitative ef­
fects on immigrant Latino employment based on the vulnerability framework we 
have previously delineated and taking into consideration their reduced social bar­
gaining power.
Another related topic of utmost importance is the crisis’s effect on Latino im­
migrant flows in the U.s. and Spain and their return to their countries of origin and/
or emigration to third countries. Currently, there is little evidence of return migra­
tion as a result of the financial crisis in the U.s. and Europe. It seems that the experi­
ence of previous recessions is being repeated: most migrants are not willing to return 
in large numbers to poorer countries of origin, due to the low incomes and the lack 
of work prospects there. They prefer to sit out the crisis in the destination country. The 
only migrants likely to return may well be those that the destination country would 
prefer to retain: those with skills and prospects elsewhere and whose secure legal 
status would allow them to come back again once job markets improve (Castles and 
Miller, 2010). It seems likely that one of the keys to return migration for Latinos is the 
possibility to re­enter their destination country once the crisis has abated (Papa­
demetriou, Sumtion, and Terrazas, 2010). Immigrants will use all strategies at their 
disposal before abandoning the possibility of obtaining the documents that ensure 
the legal status that will allow them to circulate legally between countries. For example, 
an important share of the Latino returning migration from Spain is composed of im­
migrants who have obtained Spanish citizenship and therefore can return to Spain 
when they wish. Moreover, it has been observed that “legal immigration can often 
show less correlation with economic conditions in the country of destination than ille­
gal immigration, because it is more likely to included family reunification, students, 
workers directly recruited by employers, or those waiting for their application to be 
processed” (Rogers, 2009: 38; Papademetriou and Terrazas, 2009). This future analy­
sis of migration flows should also include the short-term and long-term effects of the 
crisis and the effect a potential extended period of economic recovery will have on 
Latino immigrant stocks in the U.s. and Spain, considering both the authorized and 
unauthorized immigrant populations. 
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